Blockchain adoption strategies for combating deficient personal protective equipment in major public health emergencies

Fanshun Zhang, Hao Huang (), Cejun Cao () and Zhen Tan
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Fanshun Zhang: Xiangtan University
Hao Huang: Nottingham University Business School China, University of Nottingham Ningbo China
Cejun Cao: Chongqing Technology and Business University
Zhen Tan: Nottingham University Business School China, University of Nottingham Ningbo China

Annals of Operations Research, 2025, vol. 348, issue 3, No 20, 1745-1797

Abstract: Abstract The use of deficient personal protective equipment (PPE) during major public health emergencies poses huge challenges for containing virus transmission. Blockchain technology has been touted as an effective solution to address this issue, but its adoption by companies has been limited due to the high investment risks. Therefore, this study proposes a cost–benefit analysis based on Stackelberg game model involving a government and two companies respectively producing qualified and deficient PPE, to examine the impact of blockchain technology adoption on PPE manufacturing. Besides, the mechanism on how government subsidy affects the blockchain adoption decision is also explored. The findings reveal that blockchain technology adoption is the most favourable option for all stakeholders during the early stages of a public health emergency. However, the quality of qualified PPE may decrease due to the quality disclosure effect and profit maximization. Output subsidy is the optimal strategy when the number of ordinary users is large. For governments, subsidizing blockchain technology adoption not only helps combat the production of deficient PPE but also provides operational guidance to improve the performance of emergency use authorization by identifying products that have only a slightly lower quality than the standard.

Keywords: Blockchain adoption; Personal protective equipment; Government subsidy; Cost–benefit analysis; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05611-z

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