EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Sustainable farming practices adoption in agriculture supply chain: the role of indirect support versus cost subsidy

Mohit Ray, Ajit Pratap Singh and Suresh Kumar Jakhar ()
Additional contact information
Mohit Ray: Indian Institute of Management Lucknow
Ajit Pratap Singh: Indian Institute of Management Lucknow
Suresh Kumar Jakhar: Indian Institute of Management Lucknow

Annals of Operations Research, 2025, vol. 355, issue 1, No 36, 1015-1040

Abstract: Abstract Due to the growing environmental concerns and associated health issues of using fertilisers and pesticides in agriculture, Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZNBF) is gaining traction to guide farmers toward sustainable farming practices. Therefore, to promote sustainability and also to safeguard the interests of small farmers who adopt ZNBF, the government in developing economies are adopting two prevalent intervention mechanisms: (i) cost subsidy and (ii) indirect support. However, little has been done to provide clear-cut directives on when to employ these intervention mechanisms, especially in the presence of heterogeneous farmers and yield uncertainty. Therefore, in this paper, we consider a supply chain comprising a government, small farmers, and consumers, and we perform a comparative analysis to understand the prevailing conditions under which a particular policy outperforms another in maximizing social welfare by promoting ZBNF practices. We develop a government-farmer game-theoretic model wherein the government first selects the intervening mechanism to maximise social welfare, followed by farmers’ sowing decisions. Our analysis reveals that both policies positively impact the adoption of ZBNF practices; however, in the scenario of higher environmental damage, cost subsidy outperforms the indirect support mechanism. On the contrary, for medium and lower environmental damage, the choice of intervention depends on the proportion of environmentally conscious farmers. Specifically, the government should extend indirect support only if there exists a critical mass of environmentally conscious farmers. Our findings from analytical and numerical analysis assist the government in identifying and designing the appropriate intervention mechanisms whereas to farmers in their showing decisions.

Keywords: Sustainability; Government policy; Cost subsidy; Indirect support; Agricultural supply chain; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-023-05559-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:355:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-023-05559-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05559-0

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-12-10
Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:355:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-023-05559-0