Restricted attention, myopic play, and thelearning of equilibrium

Sjur Flåm

Annals of Operations Research, 1998, vol. 82, issue 0, 59-82

Abstract: We consider repeated play of noncooperative games in which agents have more decisionsto consider at every stage than their attention allows. However, under a monotonicityassumption, if every variable is adjusted cyclically, as guided by marginal payoffs, thenmyopic steps lead to Nash equilibrium in the long run. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1018987409039

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