Dynamics in divide the money game with bribing

V. Pasetta

Annals of Operations Research, 1999, vol. 88, issue 0, 377 pages

Abstract: This paper addresses a class of divide asset games with externalities, where transfersamong players are not observed over the traditional economic devices but may, nevertheless,crucially determine the outcome of the game. In particular, the issues are discussed over adivide the money game where externalities take the form of bribes. The theory of operatoralgebras in dynamical systems and the theory of unbounded derivations are applied to obtainan insight into economic phenomena, embodying a process of formation and institutionalizationof externalities that arise and are in focus within this setting of the model. Thesuggested approach offers a better insight into the flows of economic wealth among theagents, and can be effectively used in searching for an optimal control of transfers in conflictsituations within a nonstandard economic environment. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1018950901654

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