On the concepts of rationalizability in games

Stanisław Ambroszkiewicz

Annals of Operations Research, 2000, vol. 97, issue 1, 55-68

Abstract: Rationalizability arises when the decision situations and rational behaviors of the players are common knowledge among them. We extend the notion of rationalizability, introduced by Bernheim [5] and Pearce [18] for Bayesian behavior, to some another kinds of player's behavior. We also present a representation of common knowledge consisting in introducing an additional player who sends messages to the players. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Keywords: games; rationalizability; common knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1018952930188

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