Welfare Implications of Entry Deterrence in a Spatial Market

Dominicus Priyarsono

The Annals of Regional Science, 1992, vol. 26, issue 4, 319-30

Abstract: Based on Bonanno's (1987) model, this paper provides examples showing that (1) without locational regulation, antimonopoly regulation leads to the worst social welfare, and (2) protection of a monopolist is justifiable in a spatial market.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:anresc:v:26:y:1992:i:4:p:319-30

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