The Stability of a Collusive Spatial Oligopoly

D Damania

The Annals of Regional Science, 1993, vol. 27, issue 4, 363-70

Abstract: This paper examines the stability of a free entry spatial equilibrium when firms set collusive Loschian prices. Drawing on developments in game theory is shown that (Loschian) collusive pricing is feasible and sustainable only if firms earn excess profits. The final section of the paper briefly examines some of the comparative static properties of the model.

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:anresc:v:27:y:1993:i:4:p:363-70

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