Cournot oligopolistic competition in spatially separated markets: The Stackelberg equilibrium

Pablo Dorta-González, Dolores R. Santos-Peñate () and Rafael Suárez-Vega ()

The Annals of Regional Science, 2004, vol. 38, issue 3, 499-511

Abstract: Consider a two-stage non-cooperative Cournot game with location choice involving r firms. There are n spatially separated markets located at the vertices of a network. Each firm, first selects the location of a facility and then selects the quantities to supply to the markets in order to maximize its profit. Non-zero conjectural variation at the second stage in the model by Sarkar et al. (1997) is studied. When the demand in each market is sufficiently large, equilibrium in the quantities offered by each firm in the markets exists. Furthermore, each firm chooses to locate its facility at the vertices. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: L13; R30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00168-003-0155-8 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:anresc:v:38:y:2004:i:3:p:499-511

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://link.springer.com/journal/168

DOI: 10.1007/s00168-003-0155-8

Access Statistics for this article

The Annals of Regional Science is currently edited by Martin Andersson, E. Kim and Janet E. Kohlhase

More articles in The Annals of Regional Science from Springer, Western Regional Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().