Optimal zoning of a mixed duopoly

Juan Bárcena-Ruiz, F. Casado-Izaga and Hamid Hamoudi ()

The Annals of Regional Science, 2014, vol. 52, issue 1, 153 pages

Abstract: This paper studies the optimal zoning of a mixed duopoly when the objective function of the public firm is a weighted sum of its profits and social surplus. We find that a regulator may attain the optimal locations of both firms by restricting the location of the private firm only. There is no need to limit the location of the public firm. In contrast, in a private duopoly, the regulator needs to restrict the locations of both firms. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: L13; R38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00168-013-0579-8

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