On spatial competition with quadratic transport costs and one online firm
Stefano Colombo () and
Zemin Hou ()
Additional contact information
Zemin Hou: Northeastern University
The Annals of Regional Science, 2019, vol. 63, issue 1, No 10, 247 pages
Abstract Guo and Lai (Ann Reg Sci 52(1):309–324, 2014) argue that, under quadratic transport costs, when two offline firms compete with one online firm, the two offline firms locate in such a way that they occupy unconnected regions in the market. However, we offer a counterexample to show that their provided condition is not sufficient to support existence of subgame perfect equilibria, because location deviations to different market structures are not taken into account.
JEL-codes: L13 C72 D21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00168-019-00934-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:anresc:v:63:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s00168-019-00934-x
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
The Annals of Regional Science is currently edited by Martin Andersson, E. Kim and Janet E. Kohlhase
More articles in The Annals of Regional Science from Springer, Western Regional Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().