On spatial competition with quadratic transport costs and one online firm

Stefano Colombo () and Zemin Hou ()
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Zemin Hou: Northeastern University

The Annals of Regional Science, 2019, vol. 63, issue 1, No 10, 247 pages

Abstract: Abstract Guo and Lai (Ann Reg Sci 52(1):309–324, 2014) argue that, under quadratic transport costs, when two offline firms compete with one online firm, the two offline firms locate in such a way that they occupy unconnected regions in the market. However, we offer a counterexample to show that their provided condition is not sufficient to support existence of subgame perfect equilibria, because location deviations to different market structures are not taken into account.

JEL-codes: C72 D21 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00168-019-00934-x

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