Partial ownership of local firms and zoning of neighboring towns
Juan Bárcena-Ruiz () and
The Annals of Regional Science, 2020, vol. 65, issue 1, No 2, 27-43
Abstract This paper investigates zoning in two neighboring towns in which firms are owned by investors that reside in the two towns. We find that local regulators use zoning strategically depending on the weight of local profits in social welfare. When they are high enough, both towns are zoned. For intermediate values an asymmetric result emerges: Only one regulator resorts to zoning despite the symmetry in the percentage of ownership of the neighboring firms. For a low weight of local profits, towns may or may not be zoned. Zoning restrictions on the location of firms are tighter when local profits are more significant for social welfare.
JEL-codes: L13 R32 R38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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