Rumor Governance Under Uncertain Conditions: An Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

Xuefan Dong () and Lei Tang ()
Additional contact information
Xuefan Dong: Beijing University of Technology
Lei Tang: Beijing University of Technology

Annals of Data Science, 2025, vol. 12, issue 3, No 12, 1073-1111

Abstract: Abstract In the rapidly evolving landscape of online information dissemination, managing rumors has become an imperative challenge for governments worldwide. This study employs a tripartite evolutionary game model to examine the behavior evolution of the government, online media, and netizens in the process of rumor propagation under uncertain conditions. The innovation of the model lies in considering the probability of successful rumor detection under government regulation, the uncertainty of rumor dissemination by online media and netizens, and introducing a dynamic government penalty mechanism. Through simulation and analysis, we identify the evolutionarily stable strategies of each participant under different scenarios and provide specific governance strategies for each party involved. The results reveal that appropriate government penalties, proactive regulation by online media, and rational choices by netizens can effectively curb rumor spreading. In uncertain environments, adopting flexible policies and dynamic adjustment mechanisms is crucial for effective rumor governance. The results reveal that appropriate government penalties, proactive regulation by online media, and rational choices by netizens can effectively curb rumor spreading. In uncertain environments, adopting flexible policies and dynamic adjustment mechanisms is crucial for effective rumor governance. This study not only enriches the application of evolutionary game theory but also offers practical strategic recommendations for policymakers to address the challenges of rumor propagation.

Keywords: Rumor governance; Evolutionary game theory; Uncertainty; Government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40745-025-00606-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:aodasc:v:12:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s40745-025-00606-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.springer ... gement/journal/40745

DOI: 10.1007/s40745-025-00606-y

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Data Science is currently edited by Yong Shi

More articles in Annals of Data Science from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().