Measuring the power of soft correlated equilibrium in 2-facility simple non-increasing linear congestion games

Ferenc Forgó ()

Central European Journal of Operations Research, 2014, vol. 22, issue 1, 139-155

Abstract: The performance of soft correlated equilibrium, a new generalization of Aumann’s correlated equilibrium (Forgó in Math Soc Sci 60:186–190, 2010 ) is measured in $$2$$ -facility simple non-increasing linear congestion games. The mediation value and the enforcement value are determined for $$2,3$$ and $$4$$ -person games and bounds are computed for the general $$n$$ -person case. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Correlation; Congestion games; Mediation value; Enforcement value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10100-012-0279-y

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