Communication strategies to contrast anti-vax action: a differential game approach

Alessandra Buratto (), Rudy Cesaretto () and Maddalena Muttoni ()
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Alessandra Buratto: Università degli Studi di Padova
Rudy Cesaretto: Università degli Studi di Padova
Maddalena Muttoni: Università degli Studi di Padova

Central European Journal of Operations Research, 2025, vol. 33, issue 1, No 8, 210 pages

Abstract: Abstract Vaccination is one of the greatest discoveries of modern medicine, capable of defeating many diseases. However, misleading information on the effectiveness of vaccines has caused a decline in vaccination coverage in some countries, leading to the reappearance of related diseases. Therefore, a proper and well-planned pro-vax communication campaign may be effective in convincing people to get vaccinated. We formulate and solve a differential game with an infinite horizon played à la Nash. The players involved in the game are the national healthcare system and a pharmaceutical firm that produces and sells a certain type of vaccine. The former aims to minimize the healthcare costs that unvaccinated people would entail. In turn, the pharmaceutical firm wants to minimize the missed profits from unsold vaccines. The two players run suitable vaccination advertising campaigns to diminish the à-régime number of unvaccinated. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman approach is used to determine a Markovian-Nash equilibrium, studying how communication strategies can be effective in reducing the strength of anti-vax word of mouth.

Keywords: Differential games; Stationary Markovian nash equilibrium; Vaccine communication policy; Advertising; 49N90; 90B60; 49N10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10100-024-00917-0

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