Generic substitution policy, an incentive approach

Aida Isabel Tavares

Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 2017, vol. 23, issue 2, No 2, 199-220

Abstract: Abstract Generic substitution policy has been adopted in several countries in order to control health expenditures. Using a model based on incentives, this work aims to analyze the response of doctors and pharmaceutical companies to the implementation of this policy. It is shown that after the implementation of GSP, the effort of doctor’s convincing the patient to take generics increase or decrease depending on his level of concern for patient well-being; pharmaceutical companies decrease the amount of detailing and the market share of generics tends to increase.

Keywords: Generic substitution policy; Incentives; Drugs market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s10588-016-9223-3

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