Analysis of dynamics of voting system for small number of candidates
Neelam Gohar (),
Gul E. Saman (),
Salma Noor (),
Sehrish Aslam (),
Maryam Khan (),
Anam Qadeer () and
Fawad Qayum ()
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Neelam Gohar: Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University
Gul E. Saman: Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University
Salma Noor: Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University
Sehrish Aslam: Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University
Maryam Khan: Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University
Anam Qadeer: Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University
Fawad Qayum: University of Malakand
Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 2019, vol. 25, issue 3, No 1, 225-246
Abstract A significant research topic in the area of computational social choice is the complication of different kinds of dishonest behaviour like manipulation, dominance and bribery. Whereas most of the work on this issue assumes that the opposite party has incomplete knowledge regarding every agent, they did not know the true preferences of other voters. We have analysed the dynamics of voting rules with the help of some manipulative and non-manipulative moves. Voters have incomplete information. The voters are aware of the winner at every stage and they make short term rational decisions. The number of candidates and voters are small, and the decisions need to be made quickly. We want the better reply as low as possible while keeping the best reply as high as possible. The voting rules we have used are Plurality rule and Borda rule. We have analysed the dynamics for these two voting rules for small number of voters and candidates.
Keywords: Manipulation; Rationality; Preference aggregation; Game theory; Multi-agent systems (MASs); Computational social choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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