Characterizing the roles of preference homophily and network structure on outcomes of consensus games

Pratyush Arya () and Nisheeth Srivastava
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Pratyush Arya: Indian Institute of Technology
Nisheeth Srivastava: Indian Institute of Technology

Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 2025, vol. 31, issue 2, No 4, 139-160

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents results from in silico experiments trying to uncover the mechanisms by which people both succeed and fail to reach consensus in networked games, for network structures produced by a variety of generative mechanisms. We find that the primary cause for failure in such games is preferential selection of information sources. Agents forced to sample information from randomly selected fixed neighborhoods eventually converge to a consensus, while agents free to form their own neighborhoods and forming them on the basis of homophily frequently end up creating balkanized cliques. Small-world structure attenuates the drive towards consensus in fixed networks, but not in self-selecting networks. Preferentially attached networks show the highest convergence to consensus, thereby showing resilience to balkanization even in self-selecting networks. We investigate the reasons for such behavior by altering graph properties of generated networks. We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of our findings for representing behavior in socio-cultural modeling.

Keywords: Social preference; Preference learning; Agent-based modeling; Clique formation; Balkanization; Filter bubbles; Polarization; Network hubs; Opinion dynamics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10588-025-09396-3

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