The Value of Preference Information in Agency Relationships
Rudolf Vetschera ()
Additional contact information
Rudolf Vetschera: University of Vienna
Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 1999, vol. 5, issue 4, No 2, 343-360
Abstract:
Abstract Standard models of agency theory often assume that the principal has complete information about the preferences of the agent. This paper starts from the assumption of incomplete information on the agent&2018;s preferences and models a situation where the principal can obtain additional preference information before concluding a contract with the agent. We introduce the concept of a Value of Preference Information (VPI), which describes the benefits to the principal from obtaining such information. This information can be obtained either before or after the principal knows the precise structure of the decision problems which will be delegated to the agent. Analytic and simulation techniques are used to study factors influencing the VPI in these two situations.
Keywords: agency theory; preference information; value of information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1023/A:1009694517754 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:comaot:v:5:y:1999:i:4:d:10.1023_a:1009694517754
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10588
DOI: 10.1023/A:1009694517754
Access Statistics for this article
Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory is currently edited by Terrill Frantz and Kathleen Carley
More articles in Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().