Subsidy Competition in Networks

H.A. Eiselt
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H.A. Eiselt: University of New Brunswick

Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 2000, vol. 6, issue 1, No 7, 99-111

Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates a competitive location model on a network with free entry and exit. The given network consists of regions that represent independent jurisdictions. Market entry and exit are sequential. In each stage of the multi-stage game, the regions simultaneously decide what subsidy to offer to a firm should it located within its boundaries. The paper delineates three distinct classes of subsidy policies and examines their effects in a series of computational tests.

Keywords: competitive location models; regional planning; Stackelberg solution; subsidies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1009629410788

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