Divide and conquer: the engineering of delegation
Simona Settepanella (),
Gennaro Amendola (),
Luigi Marengo () and
Connor Minto ()
Additional contact information
Simona Settepanella: Torino University
Gennaro Amendola: eCampus University
Luigi Marengo: LUISS University
Connor Minto: Hokkaido University
Computational Management Science, 2022, vol. 19, issue 4, No 3, 605-626
Abstract:
Abstract Members of an organization have conflicting preferences. Principal-agent theory analyzes how and under which conditions this conflict can be resolved by means of incentives. In this paper we discuss an alternative to incentives: the engineering of delegation. The principal can divide the organizational decision making problem into subproblems and appropriately delegate different subproblems to different agents, letting them free to act according to their individual preferences. We introduce a formal model which analyzes whether and under which conditions the principal can in this way obtain the decisions she prefers without manipulating incentives nor using authority to overrule what agents autonomously decide.
Keywords: Delegation; Conflict; Complexity; Agency theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10287-022-00428-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:comgts:v:19:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s10287-022-00428-w
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ch/journal/10287/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s10287-022-00428-w
Access Statistics for this article
Computational Management Science is currently edited by Ruediger Schultz
More articles in Computational Management Science from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().