Stackelberg problems with followers in the grand coalition of a Tu-game

C. Pensavalle () and G. Pieri

Decisions in Economics and Finance, 2013, vol. 36, issue 1, 89-98

Abstract: In this article, a case of partial cooperation in a game theory framework is studied. The interest is on a bi-level Stackelberg problem where one of the players is the leader and the rest are the followers, involved in a TU-game. The continuity, with respect to the leader’s choice, of the Shapley value function and the core correspondence of the TU-game is investigated. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Stakelberg equilibrium; Leader–follower; TU-games; Core; Shapley value; Primary C70: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Secondary C71: Cooperative Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s10203-011-0122-2

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