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Equilibria in Altruistic Economic Growth Models

Łukasz Balbus, Anna Jaśkiewicz and Andrzej Nowak ()

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2020, vol. 10, issue 1, No 1, 18 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we consider a stochastic economic growth model in the form of an intergenerational dynamic game. Both paternalistic and non-paternalistic components are present in the model. Under very general assumptions allowing for unbounded utility functions and weakly continuous transitions, we establish the existence of Markov perfect equilibria that consist of a consumption strategy and an indirect utility function. In the pure paternalistic case, we obtain new results on equilibria. An important point of our contribution is that we make no separability assumptions on the utility functions of generations.

Keywords: Stochastic game; Intergenerational game; Altruistic growth models; Markov perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-019-00305-3

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