On Common Belief in Future Rationality in Games with Ambiguous Orderings of Information Sets

Iryna Topolyan ()
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Iryna Topolyan: University of Cincinnati

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2020, vol. 10, issue 1, No 9, 183-201

Abstract: Abstract Perea (Games Econ Behav 83:231–254, 2014) introduced common belief in future rationality for dynamic games whose information sets could be unambiguously ordered. It is shown that common belief in future rationality may be possible even in the absence of such an order. We characterize a class of dynamic game forms for which common belief in future rationality is always possible. We introduce a new concept, common belief in future$$^{\star }$$⋆ rationality, which is attained in all dynamic games with perfect recall, regardless of the order of information sets.

Keywords: Epistemic game theory; Dynamic games; Common belief in future rationality; Information set; Partial order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-019-00314-2

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