Pursuit Strategy of Motion Camouflage in Dynamic Games

Ivan Matychyn ()
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Ivan Matychyn: University of Warmia and Mazury

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2020, vol. 10, issue 1, No 7, 145-156

Abstract: Abstract This work was inspired by an example of a pursuit strategy whereby a pursuer approaches an evader while appearing stationary to the latter. This effect is achieved due to the fact that the pursuer P stays on the line connecting some fixed reference point R and current position of the evader E. According to recent researches of biologists (Mizutani et al. in Nature 423(6940):604, 2003), such a strategy called motion camouflage is adopted by some insects, e.g., dragonflies. As it is shown in Anderson and McOwan (Proc R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 270(Suppl 1): S18–S20, 2003), humans can be also tricked in the same way. Interesting results on comparison of capture times for the motion camouflage strategy and some classic pursuit strategies are obtained in Glendinning (Proc R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 271(1538): 477–481, 2004) using computer simulation. This paper further expands results of Matichin and Chikriy (J Autom Inf Sci 37(3):1–5, 2005), providing explicit formulas for the pursuer control input implementing motion camouflage pursuit strategy with the reference point that does not coincides with pursuer’s initial position.

Keywords: Differential game; Pursuit strategy; Motion camouflage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-019-00316-0

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