Solution to a Zero-Sum Differential Game with Fractional Dynamics via Approximations

Mikhail Gomoyunov ()
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Mikhail Gomoyunov: Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2020, vol. 10, issue 2, No 5, 417-443

Abstract: Abstract The paper deals with a zero-sum differential game in which the dynamical system is described by a fractional differential equation with the Caputo derivative of an order $$\alpha \in (0, 1).$$α∈(0,1). The goal of the first (second) player is to minimize (maximize) a given quality index. The main contribution of the paper is the proof of the fact that this differential game has the value, i.e., the lower and upper game values coincide. The proof is based on the appropriate approximation of the game by a zero-sum differential game in which the dynamical system is described by a first-order functional differential equation of a retarded type. It is shown that the values of the approximating differential games have a limit, and this limit is the value of the original game. Moreover, the optimal players’ feedback control procedures are proposed that use the optimally controlled approximating system as a guide. An example is considered, and the results of computer simulations are presented.

Keywords: Differential game; Value of the game; Optimal strategies; Fractional derivative; Fractional differential equation; Approximation; Control with a guide (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-019-00320-4

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