Modelling Evolution in Structured Populations Involving Multiplayer Interactions

Mark Broom (), Igor V. Erovenko () and Jan Rychtář ()
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Mark Broom: City, University of London
Igor V. Erovenko: University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Jan Rychtář: Virginia Commonwealth University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2021, vol. 11, issue 2, No 3, 270-293

Abstract: Abstract We consider models of evolution in structured populations involving multiplayer games. Whilst also discussing other models, we focus on the modelling framework developed by Broom and Rychtář (J Theor Biol 302:70–80, 2012) onwards. This includes key progress so far, the main gaps and limitations, the relationship and synergies with other models and a discussion of the direction of future work. In this regard as well as discussing existing work, there is some new research on the applicability and robustness of current models with respect to using them to model real populations. This is an important potential advance, as previously all of the work has been entirely theoretical. In particular, the most complex models will have many parameters, and we concentrate on considering simpler versions with a small number of parameters which still possess the key features which would make them applicable. We find that these models are generally robust, in particular issues that can arise related to small payoff changes at critical values and removal of pivotal vertices would have similar effects on other modelling system including evolutionary graph theory. These often occur where it can be argued that there is a lack of robustness in the real system that the model faithfully picks up, and so is not a problematic feature.

Keywords: Structured populations; Multiplayer games; Markov model; Aggregation; Robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-020-00358-9

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