An Update on Continuous-Time Stochastic Games of Fixed Duration

Yehuda Levy

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2021, vol. 11, issue 2, No 9, 418-432

Abstract: Abstract This paper shows that continuous-time stochastic games of fixed duration need not possess equilibria in Markov strategies. The example requires payoffs and transitions to depend on time in a continuous but irregular (almost nowhere almost differentiable) way. This example offers a correction to the erroneous construction presented previously in Levy (Dyn Games Appl 3(2):279–312, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0067-2 ).

Keywords: Stochastic games; Continuous-time games; Equilibrium existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-020-00361-0

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