Upper and Lower Values in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Asymmetric Information
Dhruva Kartik () and
Ashutosh Nayyar ()
Additional contact information
Dhruva Kartik: University of Southern California
Ashutosh Nayyar: University of Southern California
Dynamic Games and Applications, 2021, vol. 11, issue 2, No 6, 363-388
Abstract A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player’s information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain conditions on the evolution of the common and private information, a dynamic programming characterization of the value of the game (if it exists) is presented. If the value of the zero-sum game does not exist, then the dynamic program provides bounds on the upper and lower values of the game.
Keywords: Dynamic games; Asymmetric information; Upper and lower values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-020-00364-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:11:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s13235-020-00364-x
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Dynamic Games and Applications is currently edited by Georges Zaccour
More articles in Dynamic Games and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().