Subgame Maxmin Strategies in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Tolerance Levels

János Flesch (), P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Jasmine Maes () and Arkadi Predtetchinski ()
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János Flesch: Maastricht University
Jasmine Maes: Maastricht University
Arkadi Predtetchinski: Maastricht University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2021, vol. 11, issue 4, No 3, 704-737

Abstract: Abstract We study subgame $$\phi $$ ϕ -maxmin strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games with a countable state space, finite action spaces, and a bounded and universally measurable payoff function. Here, $$\phi $$ ϕ denotes the tolerance function that assigns a nonnegative tolerated error level to every subgame. Subgame $$\phi $$ ϕ -maxmin strategies are strategies of the maximizing player that guarantee the lower value in every subgame within the subgame-dependent tolerance level as given by $$\phi $$ ϕ . First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be a subgame $$\phi $$ ϕ -maxmin strategy. As a special case, we obtain a characterization for subgame maxmin strategies, i.e., strategies that exactly guarantee the lower value at every subgame. Secondly, we present sufficient conditions for the existence of a subgame $$\phi $$ ϕ -maxmin strategy. Finally, we show the possibly surprising result that each game admits a strictly positive tolerance function $$\phi ^*$$ ϕ ∗ with the following property: if a player has a subgame $$\phi ^*$$ ϕ ∗ -maxmin strategy, then he has a subgame maxmin strategy too. As a consequence, the existence of a subgame $$\phi $$ ϕ -maxmin strategy for every positive tolerance function $$\phi $$ ϕ is equivalent to the existence of a subgame maxmin strategy.

Keywords: Stochastic games; Zero-sum games; Subgame $$\phi $$ ϕ -maxmin strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Subgame maxmin strategies in zero-sum stochastic games with tolerance levels (2018)
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-021-00378-z

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