Privacy, Patience, and Protection

Ronen Gradwohl () and Rann Smorodinsky ()
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Ronen Gradwohl: Ariel University
Rann Smorodinsky: The Technion–Israel Institute of Technology

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2021, vol. 11, issue 4, No 5, 759-784

Abstract: Abstract We analyze repeated games in which players have private information about their levels of patience and in which they would like to maintain the privacy of this information vis-à-vis third parties. We show that privacy protection in the form of shielding players’ actions from outside observers is harmful, as it limits and sometimes eliminates the possibility of attaining Pareto-optimal payoffs.

Keywords: Privacy; Privacy protection; Perception games; Signaling games; C72; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-021-00386-z

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