Game-Theoretical Model of the Voluntary Use of Insect Repellents to Prevent Zika Fever

Jabili Angina, Anish Bachhu, Eesha Talati, Rishi Talati, Jan Rychtář () and Dewey Taylor
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Jabili Angina: Virginia Commonwealth University
Anish Bachhu: Virginia Commonwealth University
Eesha Talati: Virginia Commonwealth University
Rishi Talati: Virginia Commonwealth University
Jan Rychtář: Virginia Commonwealth University
Dewey Taylor: Virginia Commonwealth University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2022, vol. 12, issue 1, No 6, 133-146

Abstract: Abstract Zika fever is an emerging mosquito-borne disease. While it often causes no or only mild symptoms that are similar to dengue fever, Zika virus can spread from a pregnant woman to her baby and cause severe birth defects. There is no specific treatment or vaccine, but the disease can be mitigated by using several control strategies, generally focusing on the reduction in mosquitoes or mosquito bites. In this paper, we model Zika virus transmission and incorporate a game-theoretical approach to study a repeated population game of DEET usage to prevent insect bites. We show that the optimal use effectively leads to disease elimination. This result is robust and not significantly dependent on the cost of the insect repellents.

Keywords: Zika virus; Nash equilibrium; Game theory; Vector-borne diseases; Insect repellent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-021-00418-8

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