COVID-19 and Stigma: Evolution of Self-restraint Behavior

Kenichi Kurita (kurita.kenichi.564@m.kyushu-u.ac.jp) and Shunsuke Managi

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2022, vol. 12, issue 1, No 8, 168-182

Abstract: Abstract Social stigma can effectively prevent people from going out and possibly spreading COVID-19. Using the framework of replicator dynamics, we analyze the interaction between self-restraint behavior, infection with viruses such as COVID-19, and stigma against going out. Our model is analytically solvable with respect to an interior steady state in contrast to the previous model of COVID-19 with stigma. We show that a non-legally binding policy reduces the number of people going out in a steady state.

Keywords: COVID-19; Stigma; Self-restraint behavior; Non-pharmaceutical interventions; Replicator dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Working Paper: COVID-19 and stigma: Evolution of self-restraint behavior (2020)
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00426-2

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