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Adverse Selection, Heterogeneous Beliefs, and Evolutionary Learning

Clemens Buchen () and Alberto Palermo ()
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Clemens Buchen: WHU-Otto Beisheim School of Management
Alberto Palermo: Trier University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2022, vol. 12, issue 2, No 2, 343-362

Abstract: Abstract We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning set-up, which is imitative, principals can have different beliefs about the distribution of agents’ types in the population. The resulting nonlinear dynamic system is studied. Convergence to a uniform belief depends on the relative size of the bias in beliefs.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Imitation equilibrium; Heterogeneous beliefs; Adverse selection; Cobweb model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C73 D82 D83 E32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-021-00396-x

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