A New Evolutionary Game Analysis for Industrial Pollution Management Considering the Central Government’s Punishment

Fulei Shi, Chuansheng Wang () and Cuiyou Yao
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Fulei Shi: Capital University of Economics and Business
Chuansheng Wang: Capital University of Economics and Business
Cuiyou Yao: Capital University of Economics and Business

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2022, vol. 12, issue 2, No 14, 677-688

Abstract: Abstract This study conducts a new evolutionary game analysis for industrial pollution management under dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), in which the central government’s punishment to the local government is taken into consideration. Then, we compared the two models under the DPM. Moreover, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the evolution path between the local government and the enterprise tends to converge to a stable value under the basic model. Notably, when we add the central government’s punishment to the model, the evolution path between the local government and the enterprise will tend to spiral converge to a stable focus. Thus, the new evolutionary game model that we presented is more conducive than the basic model. The central government’s punishment mechanism will take an active role in dealing with industrial pollution problems.

Keywords: Evolutionary game; Industrial pollution; Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-021-00407-x

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