Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Random Rules of Priority, Discrete Linear-Quadratic Model

Daniel Hernández-Hernández () and Joshué H. Ricalde-Guerrero ()
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Daniel Hernández-Hernández: Research Center for Mathematics
Joshué H. Ricalde-Guerrero: Research Center for Mathematics

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2022, vol. 12, issue 4, No 12, 1293-1311

Abstract: Abstract This paper is concerned with zero-sum stochastic games with random rules of priority; this means that at each turn one of the players is randomly selected and will be able to see the decision of the other player, before his own action is chosen. We focus on the discrete linear-quadratic model, since its tractability allows us to obtain explicit expressions for the equilibrium strategies. These controls are expressed in terms of the parameters of the model and are adapted to the information available for both players in each turn. The dependence of the noise in the solution is also analysed. Finally, an example is implemented and explored through simulations in a program coded in Python.

Keywords: Zero-sum stochastic game; Stochastic control; Discrete linear-quadratic control; Random rules of priority; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-021-00417-9

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