An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining

Michela Chessa, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Aymeric Lardon and Takashi Yamada ()
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Takashi Yamada: Yamaguchi University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2023, vol. 13, issue 2, No 10, 589-609

Abstract: Abstract In this experiment, we compare three implementations of the Winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism: a one-period implementation, a two-period implementation with low delay costs, and a two-period implementation with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our results show that the three different implementations result in similar outcomes in all our investigation domains: namely, coalition formation, alignment with the Shapley value prediction, and satisfaction of the axioms. Our results suggest that a lighter bargaining implementation with only one period is often sufficient in providing allocations that sustain the Shapley value as an appropriate cooperative solution concept, while saving unnecessary time and resource costs.

Keywords: Nash program; Shapley value; Experiments; Winter mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C90 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining (2022)
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00463-x

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