Subgame Perfect Coalition Formation

Greg Leo, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik and Myrna Wooders
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Greg Leo: Vanderbilt University
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik: Washington University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2023, vol. 13, issue 2, No 6, 510-524

Abstract: Abstract We analyze a dynamic game where players can each make offers to other players to form coalitions. We show that these games have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that is individually rational and, when players can make enough proposals, Pareto optimal. We also provide sufficient conditions for equilibrium to implement core coalition structures.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Sequential proposer game; Mechanism design; Subgame perfection; Pareto optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C63 C71 C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00467-7

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