Rational Noncooperative Strategic Exploitation of Species in a Predator–Prey Ecosystem with Random Disturbances

Christos Koulovatianos

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2024, vol. 14, issue 1, No 5, 57-77

Abstract: Abstract Ecological instability caused by pollution, climate change, or by exogenous distortions in the food chain of biological organisms may increase the average natural death rate of certain species, or it may increase the variance of their natural death rate, or both. Here, rational noncooperative strategic harvesting in a predator–prey ecosystem that is subject to exogenous environmental disturbances is studied through an example that delivers analytical solutions. When players exploit only one of two interacting species, then in symmetric Markovian–Nash equilibrium: (i) the ‘tragedy of the commons’ holds and (ii) when exogenous factors increase and/or make more volatile the natural geometric death rate of the species under exploitation (of the non-harvested species) each player’s harvesting rate increases (decreases) and the commons problem is intensified (mitigated).

Keywords: Resource exploitation; Food chain; Predator–prey ecosystem; Tragedy of the commons; Environmental distortions; Stochastic multidimensional differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Q22 Q23 Q27 Q56 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00527-6

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