Dynamic Resource Allocation Networks in Marketing: Comparing the Effectiveness of Control Methods

N. M. Galieva (), A. V. Korolev () and G. A. Ougolnitsky ()
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N. M. Galieva: St. Petersburg Branch of the Higher School of Economics
A. V. Korolev: St. Petersburg Branch of the Higher School of Economics
G. A. Ougolnitsky: Southern Federal University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2024, vol. 14, issue 2, No 6, 362-395

Abstract: Abstract The discrete- and continuous-time network models of opinions control and resource allocation in marketing are considered. Three cases of interaction of economic agents are studied: independent behavior, cooperation, and hierarchical control by the resource-owning Principal. The corresponding dynamic games are analytically solved. The agents’ payoffs in these cases are compared. Two concepts, “enough resources” and “a lack of resources,” are introduced and investigated. The theoretical results are illustrated by a numerical example.

Keywords: Differential games; Difference games; Hierarchical control; Network models; Resource allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00494-y

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