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Strategy Consensus of Networked Evolutionary Games with Time Invariant Delays

Zhiru Wang, Shihua Fu, Jianjun Wang and Xiaoyu Zhao ()
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Zhiru Wang: Liaocheng University
Shihua Fu: Liaocheng University
Jianjun Wang: Liaocheng University
Xiaoyu Zhao: Shandong University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2024, vol. 14, issue 4, No 9, 996 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates the strategy consensus of networked evolutionary games with time invariant delays (DNEGs) in strategies, and presents a number of new results. Firstly, the model of DNEGs is proposed, then the algebraic form is constructed for DNEGs whose strategy updating rule is myopic best response adjustment by using the semi-tensor product method. Secondly, based on the algebraic form, the strategy consensus problem of DNEGs is discussed, and a criterion is given to detect whether DNEGs can achieve strategy consensus by means of a strategy regulation approach. Furthermore, the state feedback controllers are designed to realize the strategy consensus of DNEGs. Finally, an illustrative example is given to show the effectiveness of the obtained results.

Keywords: Networked evolutionary games; Time invariant delays; Strategy consensus; Semi-tensor product of matrices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00522-x

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