Partial Information Games and Competitive Advertising

Vartika Singh () and Veeraruna Kavitha ()
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Vartika Singh: IIT Bombay
Veeraruna Kavitha: IIT Bombay

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2024, vol. 14, issue 4, No 6, 888-920

Abstract: Abstract We study a competitive advertisement process over a social network. Potential customers are hidden in the network, and multiple content providers (CPs) attempt to contact them through advertising. Any customer chooses one among the contacted CPs. The CPs are unaware of the customers already contacted by their opponents. We consider a generic framework applicable to a variety of such problems, to analyse the resulting stochastic game with partial, asymmetric, and non-classical information. Our approach is to consider special strategies, named open-loop control till information update (to manage belief updates). While deriving the best responses, we solve a bi-level control problem; every stage of the dynamic programming equation of the relevant Markov decision process is solved using optimal control tools. We finally reduce the game to a finite state game with finite-dimensional actions, prove the existence of Nash equilibrium and provide structural results. Further, we solve another partial-information game related to project management.

Keywords: Game theory; Partial information game; Markov decision; Optimal control; Social network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00530-x

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