The Duel Discounted Stochastic Game

Athanasios Kehagias ()
Additional contact information
Athanasios Kehagias: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2024, vol. 14, issue 4, No 4, 846-864

Abstract: Abstract A duel involves two stationary players who shoot at each other until at least one of them dies; a truel is similar but involves three players. In the past, the duel has been studied mainly as a component of the truel, which has received considerably more attention. However we believe that the duel is interesting in itself. In this paper we formulate the duel (with either simultaneous or sequential shooting) as a discounted stochastic game. We show that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies; however, it also possesses cooperation-promoting Nash equilibria in nonstationary strategies. We show that these are also subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, we argue that the nature of the game and its equilibria is similar to that of the repeated Prisoner’s dilemma.

Keywords: Duel; Stochastic game; Nash equilibrium; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-023-00540-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:14:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s13235-023-00540-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00540-9

Access Statistics for this article

Dynamic Games and Applications is currently edited by Georges Zaccour

More articles in Dynamic Games and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().