Influencing Opinion Networks: Optimization and Games

Wout Vos (), Peter Borm and Herbert Hamers
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Wout Vos: Tilburg University
Herbert Hamers: Tilburg University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2024, vol. 14, issue 4, No 8, 959-980

Abstract: Abstract We consider a model of influence over a network with finite-horizon opinion dynamics. The network consists of agents that update their opinions via a trust structure as in the DeGroot dynamics. The model considers two potential external influencers that have fixed and opposite opinions. They aim to maximally impact the aggregate state of opinions at the end of the finite horizon by targeting with precision one agent in one specific time period. In the case of only one influencer, we characterize optimal targets on the basis of two features: shift and amplification. Also, conditions are provided under which a specific target is optimal: the maximum-amplification target. In the case of two influencers, we focus on the existence and characterization of pure strategy equilibria in the corresponding two-person strategic zero-sum game. Roughly speaking, if the initial opinions are not too much in favour of either influencer, the influencers’ equilibrium behaviour is also driven by the amplification of targets.

Keywords: Opinion dynamics; Networks; Influence; Targeting; Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Influencing Opinion Networks - Optimization and Games (2023)
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00543-6

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