The emergence and maintenance of cooperation in the public goods game under stochastic strategy updating rule with preference

Wenman Chen, Ji Quan () and Xianjia Wang
Additional contact information
Wenman Chen: Wuhan University of Technology
Ji Quan: Wuhan University of Technology
Xianjia Wang: Wuhan University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2024, vol. 14, issue 5, No 6, 1225-1237

Abstract: Abstract This paper introduces a stochastic strategy updating rule with preference in the public goods game. Besides, we also consider the carrying capacity of individual reproductive abilities and two different types of population sizes, the fluctuating and fixed sizes. Through systematic analyses, this paper explores the impact of the preference heterogeneity in the stochastic strategy update rule on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. The results show that in both types of populations, the strategy updating rule can facilitate the evolution of cooperation by increasing the preference for cooperation, thereby alleviating the public goods dilemma. In addition, in a fixed-size population, when cooperation is a successful evolutionary strategy, increasing the preference for cooperation is beneficial to enhancing the maintenance of the cooperation. However, in a fluctuating-size finite population, reducing the preference for cooperation is beneficial to enhancing the stability of the cooperative evolutionary dynamics.

Keywords: Social dilemma; Public goods game; Preference; Random strategy selection; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-023-00548-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:14:y:2024:i:5:d:10.1007_s13235-023-00548-1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00548-1

Access Statistics for this article

Dynamic Games and Applications is currently edited by Georges Zaccour

More articles in Dynamic Games and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().