EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Stochastic Evolutionary Stability in Matrix Game with Three Pure Strategies Models

Xiu-Deng Zheng, Yi Tao () and Cong Li ()
Additional contact information
Xiu-Deng Zheng: Chinese Academy of Sciences
Yi Tao: Chinese Academy of Sciences
Cong Li: Northwestern Polytechnical University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2025, vol. 15, issue 4, No 6, 1243-1251

Abstract: Abstract In this study, to show the conditions for stochastic evolutionary stability in evolutionary game dynamics with more than two pure strategies, the results from two-phenotype models with two pure strategies are extended to the situation with three pure strategies. Our main results enrich our understanding of the stochastic evolutionary stability in situations with multiple pure strategies. In particular, it should be noted that the mathematical complexity in determining the conditions for stochastic evolutionary stability, especially for the degenerate cases with multiple pure strategies, should be given a great attention in the future study.

Keywords: Random payoff matrix; Stochastic recurrence equation; Stochastic evolutionary stability; Two-phenotype models with three pure strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-025-00621-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:15:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s13235-025-00621-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

DOI: 10.1007/s13235-025-00621-x

Access Statistics for this article

Dynamic Games and Applications is currently edited by Georges Zaccour

More articles in Dynamic Games and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-09-26
Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:15:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s13235-025-00621-x