Intrinsic Noise in Structured Replicator Dynamics Modelling Time Delays
Jacek Miȩkisz () and
Javad Mohamadichamgavi ()
Additional contact information
Jacek Miȩkisz: University of Warsaw
Javad Mohamadichamgavi: University of Warsaw
Dynamic Games and Applications, 2025, vol. 15, issue 4, No 12, 1364-1377
Abstract:
Abstract We construct and analyze structured replicator dynamics of the Snowdrift game. In our model, the offspring is put in juvenile compartments and then mature and join adult compartments with strategy-dependent rates. This is augmented by death rates and hence the population size is bounded. In the corresponding birth–death Markov jump process, rates of leaving juvenile compartments may be interpreted as inverses of averages of exponentially distributed time delays. We observe a novel behavior: for equal average time delays of both strategies, the frequency of cooperators in the quasi-stationary state of a stochastic dynamics is bigger than that in the corresponding stationary state of the deterministic structured replicator dynamics which is actually equal to the critical point of the original replicator equation for the Snowdrift game. In short, time delays favor cooperation in the presence of intrinsic stochastic fluctuations.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Structured replicator dynamics; Intrinsic noise; Random time delays; Markov jump processes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-025-00640-8 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:15:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s13235-025-00640-8
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-025-00640-8
Access Statistics for this article
Dynamic Games and Applications is currently edited by Georges Zaccour
More articles in Dynamic Games and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().