Insights into the Structured Coordination Game with Neutral Options Through Simulation

John S. McAlister () and Nina H. Fefferman
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John S. McAlister: University of Tennessee
Nina H. Fefferman: University of Tennessee

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2025, vol. 15, issue 5, No 8, 1732 pages

Abstract: Abstract Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the coordination game with discrete structure have been limited in scope, often relying on symmetric reduction of the state space or other constraints that limit the power of the model to give insight into desired applications. In this paper, we introduce a new way of thinking about equilibria of the structured coordination game with neutral strategies by means of graph partitioning. We begin with a few elementary game theoretical results and then catalogue all the Nash equilibria of the coordination game with neutral options for graphs with seven or fewer vertices. We extend our observations through the use of simulation on larger Erdős-Rényi random graphs to form the basis for proposing some conjectures about the general relationships among edge density, cluster number, and consensus stability.

Keywords: Local conventions; Evolution of cooperation; Graph partitions; Evolutionary game theory; Coordination on random graphs; Graph isomorphism reduction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-024-00612-4

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