Social Control and the Social Contract: The Emergence of Sanctioning Systems for Collective Action

Karl Sigmund (), Christoph Hauert, Arne Traulsen and Hannelore Silva

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2011, vol. 1, issue 1, 149-171

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Public goods games; Cooperation; Costly punishment; Social dilemma; Voluntary interactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-010-0001-4

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