Evolutionary Stability in First Price Auctions

Fernando Louge () and Frank Riedel

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2012, vol. 2, issue 1, 110-128

Keywords: First price auction; Evolutionary dynamics; Continuous strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Evolutionary stability of first price auctions (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-011-0034-3

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