Regret Matching with Finite Memory

Rene Saran () and Roberto Serrano

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2012, vol. 2, issue 1, 160-175

Keywords: Regret matching; Nash equilibria; Closed sets under same or better replies; Correlated equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Related works:
Working Paper: Regret Matching with Finite Memory (2010)
Working Paper: Regret Matching with Finite Memory (2010)
Working Paper: Regret matching with finite memory (2010)
Working Paper: Regret matching with finite memory (2010)
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-011-0021-8

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